State v. Miller Appellant\u27s Brief 2 Dckt. 40662 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
12-10-2014
State v. Miller Appellant's Brief 2 Dckt. 40662
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation















) KOOTENAI COU 
) 
) 
N MILLER, ) APPELLANT'S 
) IN SUPPORT OF 
Defendant-Appellant. ) PETITION FOR REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1 1 
Nature of the Case 
Justin 8. Miller asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the opinion of the Idaho 
Court of Appeals, 2014 Opinion No. 76 (Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2014) (hereinafter, Opinion). 
In its Opinion, the Court of Appeals correctly determined that the evidentiary rulings of 
the district court during the trial were erroneous. However, Mr. Miller submits that the 
Opinion, which affirmed his judgment of conviction, is in conflict with previous decisions 
of the Idaho Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals because the Court of Appeals 
1 
occu in I 
31, 11 j his held a 
house. (Trial Tr., Vol I, 1 Ls.11-1 ) At some point during the evening, a 
ing in the kitchen heard screams coming from the bedroom. (Trial 
Tr., Vol I, p.167, Ls.8-20.) The into the room, and saw Mr. Miller 
above his wife, Miller, with his hands on her 2 (Trial Tr., Vol I., 
1 , L.8.) pull from 
(Trial Tr., Vol I, 1 1, 
Ls.1 1 1 pushed, back hit her head on 
(Trial Tr., Vol I p.1 Ls.1-6.) At point, two other came into 
room, and Ms. Miller and the female guest who had been pushed exited and went to the 
kitchen. (Trial Tr., Vol I, p.278, L.14-p.279, L.3, p.281, Ls.16-25, p.173, Ls.9-25.) 
Mr. Miller began directing his guests to leave the house. (Trial Tr., Vol I, p.281, 
Ls.10-13, p.282, Ls.3-5, p.319, Ls.2-6.) After twice asking people to leave, he grabbed 
a shotgun from a shelf in the closet, but once he got it into his hands, another guest 
immediately grabbed it and took it away. (Trial Tr., Vol I, p.282, L.23 - p.283, L.9; Trial 
1 The designation "Trial Tr., Vol I" shall refer to the transcript of the trial on August 13, 
14, and 15, 2012. The designation "Trial Tr., Vol II" shall refer to the transcript of the 
trial on the afternoon of August 14, 2012. 
2 At trial, Melissa Miller testified that she had sat down on the bed next to her sleeping 
husband, and that she startled him, causing him to fling his arm such that it knocked her 
off the bed onto the floor. (Tr., p.274, L.17 - p.276, L.4.) He was bending over her, 
attending to her in the darkened bedroom when the female guest came into the room. 
(Tr., p.276, L.5 - p.277, L.13.) 
2 
Tr., 11, L.1 L.1, 1 
th 
(Trial Tr., 1 
into the she saw 
of the L.20 21 
version, Mr. Miller a shotgun her, pumped 





action, and told her that was 
.) Ms. Steen testified that when 
r. 
Information with the of for hitting his wife, 
for pointing the weapon Nadine Steen, and battery for pushing the female 
guest who tried to intercede in the interaction between Mr. Miller and his wife; 
additionally, the State sought a deadly weapon enhancement. (R., pp.190-192.) 
Mr. Miller exercised his constitutional right to a jury trial. The jury acquitted 
Mr. Miller of domestic battery; however, it convicted him of aggravated assault and 
battery. (R., pp.291-292.) The district court imposed upon Mr. Miller a unified sentence 
of five years, with two years fixed, following his conviction for aggravated assault and 
180 days for battery. (R., pp.309-311.) The district court gave Mr. Miller an opportunity 
to participate in the retained jurisdiction program. (R., pp.309-311.) Mr. Miller filed a 
timely Notice of Appeal from the Judgment - Retained Jurisdiction. (R., pp.316-318.) 
On appeal, Mr. Miller asserted that the district court erred in allowing a witness to testify 
3 
911 
in allowing an 
contained in a conversation 
Mr. Miller that, under 
she Mr. wife. 
doctrine of cumulative error, his right to a 
trial was denied as result of the accumulation of errors throughout his trial. 
(Appellant's Brief, ) 
Court of found error to but 
that errors were error claim, 
the district ·1 2.) Preliminarily, as 
that the district court in Officer Cady testify that 
parked his car far away because there was a gun involved, the Court of Appeals 
determined that there was an adverse ruling to defense counsel's relevance objection, 
concluding that "the district court implicitly overruled the objection by allowing the 
testimony to proceed." (Opinion, p.4.) The Court held that the testimony of where the 
officer parked was irrelevant as it "was not needed to enable the jury to understand how 
the charged offenses came about or to provide needed background about the offenses. 
Rather, the officer described events that took place after Miller's alleged criminal 
conduct had ceased" and such testimony was "not necessary to give the jury a 
complete story, and its absence would not have left any confusing gap in the narrative 
or resulted in misleading inferences." (Opinion, pp.4-5 (emphasis original).) However, 




Nadine testify the substance of her with the 911 
operator, Court found that the out-of-court was inadmissible hearsay, but 
ultimately concluded that it was harmless to (Opinion, pp.10-11.) 
911 was 





Mr. Miller submits that the Idaho Court of Appeals incorrectly found that it was 
to 
that the Idaho 
Idaho 
Idaho Supreme Court and its own precedent, as well as the United 
Court precedents regarding the standard for harmless error, Mr. Miller's Petition for 
Review should be granted. 
B. Standard For Granting Petitions For Review 
Idaho Appellate Rule 118(b) provides that, "[g]ranting a petition for review from a 
final decision of the Court of Appeals is discretionary on the part of the Supreme Court, 
and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons .... " Factors to 
be considered include whether the Opinion is in conflict with a previous decision of 
either the Idaho Supreme Court, the Idaho Court of Appeals, or the United States 




a a was cu of 
to. (Opinion, p.5.) That is, the Court found that, upon hearing the testimony of 
the and the testimony of Ms. Steen, the jury would have known that the officer 
was information from Ms. Steen's 911 call. (Opinion, p.5.) Ms. Steen's 
told the 911 operator was held to error though (albeit, 
error (Opinion, ·1 ·11.) Thus 
said to 91 ·1 
were prior which could 
only have to bolster her credibility with jury. Yet the Court of Appeals found 
these statements were cumulative to evidence already introduced, and therefore the 
statements' admission was harmless error. Two errors which firmly established what 
Ms. Steen told the 911 operator, and bolstered her credibility not once, but twice, could 
not be harmless error, particularly where the trial hinged on Ms. Steen's credibility. 
Because the Idaho Court of Appeals' analysis is in conflict with precedent from 
both the Idaho Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court that define the 
nature of harmless error review, Mr. Miller's Petition for Review should be granted. 
8 
the 
Opinion of the Appeals in case is contrary Idaho 
Court Court the 
the harmless error See I.AR. 118(b)(2), (3). 
The standard for determining whether an objected~to error was 
harmless was by the Idaho Supreme Court in v. ·150 209, 
0). error is by the 
violation occu , the burden of 
error was a dou the by the 
United v. u 1 (1 Perry, 
150 Idaho at To that burden, the State must "prove[ ] 'beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."' Id. at 221 
(quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24). 
In interpreting Chapman, the United States Supreme Court has explained that: 
To say that an error did not "contribute" to the ensuing verdict is not, of 
course, to say that the jury was totally unaware of that feature of the trial 
later held to have been erroneous. . . . To say that an error did not 
contribute to the verdict is, rather, to find that error unimportant in relation 
to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as 
revealed in the record. 
Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403 (1991 ), overruled in part on other grounds by 
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 n.4 (1991 ). Thus, the inquiry of an appellate court 
"is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely 
have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was 
9 
error." u . (1 
is one in 
in a vacuum, or in 
guilty in of error. 
Idaho 1, 11-12 (2013) (holding error in admitting evidence of prior 
was not harmless case was primarily on version of 
jury believed, even there was other evidence on which the jury could 
verdict). The rt in held that Chapman harmless error 
reviewing court determine error unimportant in 
the in in 
." Joy, 155 ·10 (quoting 
the truth of the matter asserted therein, is generally considered hearsay, and that 
hearsay is generally inadmissible. l.R. 801 (c), 802. 
Hearsay, which is made generally inadmissible by Idaho Rule of Evidence 
802, is defined as: "a statement, other than one made by the declarant 
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth 
of the matter asserted." I.RE. 801 (c). The hearsay rule not only prohibits 
repetition of the actual out-of-court statement; it also applies where the 
witness attempts to convey the substance or purport of the statement. 
Therefore, a hearsay objection may not be avoided merely by having the 
witness give a summary of the conversation or convey the purport of the 
information received rather than relating the details of the statement. If the 
purpose of such testimony is to prove the truth of facts asserted in the out-
of-court statement, the proffered testimony is hearsay. See 2 KENNETH 
S. BROUN et al., McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 249 at 104-105 (John 
W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter McCORMICK]; State v. Judkins, 
242 N.W.2d 266 (Iowa 1976); Commonwealth v. Parks, 273 Pa.Super. 





Q. [D]id 911 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. How long do you think your conversation was with the 911 
A. I would approximately minutes. 
Q. Did tell 1 to you? 
: I 
it. It It is 
A. 
Q. BY MR. VERHAREN: Did you indicate to the 911 operator that 
Mr. Miller pointed a shotgun at you? 
A. Yes. 
MR. LOATS: That does call for hearsay, the content of what she said. 
THE COURT: Overruled. The witness is present under oath and subject 
to cross-examination. 
BY MR. VERHAREN: Go ahead and answer. 
A. Yes, I did. 
(Trial Tr., Vol I, p.228, L.18- p.229, L.14.) 
1 
Mr. Miller asserted on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by 
admitting Nadine Steen's hearsay statement to the 911 operator. At trial, Ms. Steen 
testified that she told the 911 operator that Mr. Miller had threatened her with a gun. 
11 
, Vol I, 
to , Vol I, 
court 
Court of that the testimony 
statements, those concerning she told 911 
(Opinion, p.11.) Nadine statements that told the 911 
a if 
cou . 8 N, 
ICK ON EVi § . 2006) ("[A] even one 
the witness, is if prove the '')' D . ' . 
LEWIS, IDAHO TRIAL HANDBOOK § 19:2 (2nd ed. ("[A] witness's 
present testimony relating the witness's own past statements is hearsay."). The Court 
of Appeals correctly found that there was no purpose for offering the statement other 
than for the truth of the matter asserted, and no l.R.E. 801 (d) nonhearsay categories 
applied. (Opinion, p.11.) By definition the testimony offered was hearsay and the 
district court erred in overruling Mr. Miller's hearsay objection. 
However, the Court of Appeals did err in finding that the admission of the out of 
court statement was harmless. The United States Supreme Court has described the 
harmless error doctrine as follows: 
If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the error did not 
influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the 
judgment should stand ... But if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after 
















.... " The 
Court: "To hold an error as 
error doctrine 
an appellate 
a doubt, that there was no 
to v. 
v. u 
911 that Mr. Miller 
bolstered Nadine Steen's credibility. The State offered the out of court statement for the 
truth of the matter asserted. It was hearsay and the district court erred when it allowed 
the testimony to be presented to the jury. Because there was a timely objection, 
Mr. Miller only had the duty to prove that an error occurred, "at which point the State has 
the burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 222. 
The ultimate issue in dispute was whether Mr. Miller pointed a firearm at Nadine 
Steen. While there was other evidence on which the jury could have based its verdict, 
evidence was conflicting and there were no witnesses other than Ms. Steen. Thus the 
case was primarily based upon whose version of events the jury believed. See Joy, 155 
Idaho at 12. The State utilized the hearsay testimony to bolster Nadine Steen's 
13 
the and 
the jury with critical piece which was fairly 
to the event.3 
This case was ultimately a credibility determination which required the jury to 
if Nadine was telling was highly disputed in this trial 
was Mr. Miller was convicted on 
with it. In 
that it did not happen.4 (Trial Tr., Vol I, p.289, · Trial Tr., Vol 
II, p.45, L.23 p.47, L.23, p.89, Ls.2-20.) The fact is that, while portions of her story 
were corroborated by some eyewitnesses, other eyewitnesses controverted her claim. 
However, not one witness testified that they saw Mr. Miller aim the gun at Ms. Steen, 
cock it, and threaten to shoot her. Ms. Steen's credibility was also questionable 
because she had been drinking and several witnesses testified that she was anywhere 
from drunk to very drunk.5 (Trial Tr., Vol I, p.267, L.11 - p.268, L.20, p.298, Ls.12-13, 
Trial Tr., Vol II, p.52, Ls.3-4.) The prosecutor even told the jury that this was "strictly a 
3 Ms. Steen testified that she called 911 fifteen minutes after the incident. (Trial Tr., Vol 
I, p.216, Ls.22-25.) 
4 One guest testified that she saw Mr. Miller waving the gun around and telling people to 
leave, but not pointing it at any one person. (Trial Tr., Vol I, p.178, L.9- p.179, L.21.) 
5 The prosecutor admitted, "[t]hose women did drink. They were, to whatever degree, 




call." Tr., I, ) in 
I, 
on jury 
testimony, thus any evidence tending to (or discredit) her 
be vital to case. Thus, evidence of a prior (contemporaneous) 





that was close in time 
the jury's determination in 
witnesses. 
be 
what she told 911 
credibility jury. 
incident which purported to establish 
what occurred could have swayed the jury on whether Mr. Miller pointed the gun at 
Ms. Steen. This error was not "unimportant in relation to everything else the jury 
considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record." See Yates, 500 U.S. at 
403. Thus, it cannot be said, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the verdict was "surely 
unattributable" to the admission of the statement by Ms. Steen to the 911 operator. The 
district court's error in admitting the evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable 





is generally admissible; conversely, irrelevant evidence 
evidence is relevant is a of law is is inadmissible. 
reviewed. 
Officer 
away due to 
11. Sheldon, 1 Idaho 225, 228 (2008). 
" (Trial 
testimony about 
hearsay. (Trial Tr., Vol I, p.98, 
deputy "parked probably a 
used to 
r. 
his car and 
1 - p.99, L.6.) The district court specifically overruled 
the hearsay objection and apparently overruled the relevance objection, as the 
testimony was allowed to be presented to the jury. (Trial Tr., Vol I, p.99, Ls.3-8.) There 
was no reason to offer testimony about where the officers parked their vehicles. The 
testimony did not have a tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the action more or less probable. The evidence was completely 
irrelevant and should not have been presented to the jury. The district court abused its 
discretion allowing the evidence to be admitted. 
The Court of Appeals correctly found that the statement as to the reason why the 
law enforcement officers parked where they did was irrelevant. (Opinion, p.5.) The 












that the was relevant, its prejudicial outweighed limited 
value. l.R. . 403 states that "Although relevant, evidence may excluded if 
When 
the of 
Atkinson, 1 Idaho 816, 819 (Ct. App. 1993). 
by the of unfair prejudice ... " 




. 403 creates a balancing test. On 
one hand, the trial judge must gauge the probative worth of the proffered evidence by 
focusing upon the degrees of relevance and materiality of the evidence, and the need 
for the issue on which it is to be introduced. Davidson v. Beco Corp., 114 Idaho 107, 
111 (1987). At the other end of the equation, the trial judge must consider whether the 
evidence results in unfair prejudice. Id. 
To some extent, all probative evidence is prejudicial. State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho 
83, 88 (Ct. App. 1989). The question is whether that prejudice is unfair; whether it 
harms the defendant because it is so inflammatory that it would lead the jury to convict 




Fu the testimony of a trained police that 
would strong on a jury. was a 
determination for the jury to decide if Nadine was telling truth. As the judge 
noted in his sentencing remarks, "I think the reason you were , having sat 
through the trial, is the jury believed Nadine . They you pointed that 
her, and they probably believed you " (Trial Tr., Vol I, 
) Having jury that in a 
a in 
corroborated testimony. 
The admission of the evidence was not harmless error. explained in Section 
C, and incorporated herein by reference, because there was a timely objection, 
Mr. Miller only has the duty to prove that an error occurred, "at which point the State has 
the burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 222. The State cannot show the error was harmless in this case. 
E. Under The Doctrine Of Cumulative Error, The Accumulation Of Irregularities 
During Trial Was Sufficient To Warrant A New Trial 
Mr. Miller asserts that that numerous substantial errors occurred in his trial. 
Those were the errors discussed herein, in addition to the errors identified in the 
Appellant's Brief and found by the Court of Appeals in its Opinion, which are 
18 
by 
In (Ct. App. 1 ), 
the, "accumulation which in 
might in a ." Id. 
508 (citations omitted). Mr. Miller that the errors which occurred throughout his 
trial were not individually harmless, as the Court of . Even assuming 
arguendo that this Court finds that they were harmless, the accumulation of the errors 
and irregularities place his right a trial, and thus, mandate 
his convictions 
Miller his and that 
this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand the matter for a new trial. 
DATED this 101h day of December, 2014. 
Depufy State Appell te Public Defender 
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JUSTIN B MILLER 
WARIZONAST 
ID 83858 
BENJAMIN R SIMPSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
BRI 
CK GLOATS 
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Administrative Assistant 
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